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The retirement decisions of individuals are strongly influenced by spousal retirement, 
financial incentives and institutional constraints such as access to early retirement benefits. In 
the European Union (EU), farm retirement is encouraged by early retirement provisions for 
farmers. As exit from farming determines the characteristics of structural change in agricul-
ture, it is important to find out how spousal retirement and economic incentives affect the 
timing and type of retirement decisions among elderly farmers. This paper analyses the timing 
of early retirement decisions of farming couples using duration analysis and different exit 
channels. The empirical analysis is based on Finnish farm-level panel data for the period 
1993-1998. The results suggest that an expected pension particularly advances farm transfers. 
Farming couples are found to co-ordinate their early retirement decisions. However, farmers 
are not found to co-ordinate their early retirement according to spousal retirement under other 
pension schemes. 
 




















 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the last ten years, the Finnish agricultural sector has undergone a rapid structural 
change. The number of farms has decreased from 129,114 in 1990 to 73,714 in 2003, and 
average farm size has increased from 17.34 hectares per farm in 1990 to 30.52 hectares per 
farm in 2003 (Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003, 2004). 
Most Finnish farms are run by farm families. One of the constitutional elements of family 
farming is the farmer’s objective to transfer the farm to next generation (Pfeffer, 1989, Gasson 
and Errington, 1993). However, at the same time with decreasing number of farms, the num-
ber of farm successions has also decreased. In earlier studies, both income and economic in-
centives are found to matter. Gale (1993) also mentioned the role of policies in maintaining 
the traditional structure of farming. 
 
Despite an increasing farm size, both the importance and share of farm income of 
farm family’s total income have been decreasing whereas those with off-farm income have 
been increasing. In 1990, farm income contributed to 51% of total farm family income. Wages 
and salaries from off-farm work and other entrepreneurial activities amounted 21% of farm-
ers’ total income. In 2000, the corresponding shares were 39% and 35% (Statistics Finland, 
2003). 
 
Increasing off-farm labour participation and off-farm income may also have increased 
the economic independence of farming couples. An increased economic independence of the 
spouse may further contribute to the farmer's exit and retirement decisions. Farm income is 
found to encourage farm successions (Hennessy, 2002), but when the dependency of farm 
income decreases, probability of farm succession is expected to decrease and the probability 
of farm exits and closing down the farm to increase (Gasson and Errington, 1993, Pfeffer, 
1989; Weiss, 1999, Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Goetz and Debertin, 2001). On the other 
hand, Kimhi (1994) suggested that parents maximising family welfare may transfer a farm to 
a successor earlier, if a farmer has an off-farm work. 
 
Besides the income, also the retirement benefits significantly affect individual retire-
ment decisions (e.g. Samwick, 1998, Kerkhofs et al.,1999, Hernoes et al., 2000, Karlstrom et 
al., 2004, Asch et al,. 2005). Higher retirement benefits are also expected to increase both 
farm succession and farm closure probabilities (Pietola et al., 2003). 
 
Recently, the joint retirement decisions of couples have received attention. As couples 
like to spend leisure time together, it is most important for spouses to be able to spend their 
time in retirement together which is why they co-ordinate their retirement plans accordingly 
(Blau, 1998, Blau and Riphahn, 1999, Ruuskanen, 2004). Having a retired spouse also in-
creases the value of leisure. Therefore, individuals’ retirement decisions are strongly influ-
enced by the retirement decision of the spouse (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, Huovinen and 
Piekkola, 2002). As increasing demand of leisure has been found to increase early retirement 
(Huovinen and Piekkola, 2002), couples are expected to co-ordinate also their early retirement 
decisions. 
 
Furthermore, the level and entitlement to various welfare benefits might be affected 
by whether one or both of the spouses are retired. Because of financial effects, it is important 
to model retirement decisions of the spouses together (Blau, 1997, 1998). Glauben et al. 
(2004) also found farm succession to be postponed if the farmer’s spouse works on the farm. 
The reason for this might be financial or quite simply, the non-ability of the one spouse alone 
to take care of all farming activities. On the other hand, Pietola et al. (2003) suggested that a 
farmer is expected to retire earlier if he has a spouse. In the case of early retirement, joint re-
tirement of farming couple may be strongly affected by regulations according to which all 
entrepreneurs must give up farming activity when one of them is applying for the farmers’ 
  2early retirement scheme. However, as the dependency of farming household of farm income 
has diminished, the effect of these regulations may have also decreased. 
 
As the timing of farm retirement plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics 
of structural change in agriculture (Kimhi and Lopez, 1999), it is important to find out how 
spousal retirement, economic incentives and off-farm income affect the exit timing from farm-
ing among elderly farmers. It is also important to know how the spouses co-ordinate their exit 
decisions and under what conditions individual retirement decisions result in farm level 
changes, e.g., farm successions or farm closures. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to establish how public policies, such as early retirement 
programs, foster these choices. In this study, elderly farmers mean farmers who are suffi-
ciently old to have the option to voluntarily exit from farming using a certain pension benefit 
scheme. 
 
This study analyses the timing and type of farming couples’ early retirement deci-
sions. Analyses are based on a duration model. The duration spell is determined by the num-
ber of years between the eligibility of the farmer to the retirement scheme (lower age limit 55 
years) and the early retirement of the farmer or spouse. The analysis of farmers’ exit decisions 
concentrates on those within the farmers’ early retirement system, whereas retirement of the 
farmer or spouse under other pension schemes is included as an explanatory variable in the 
analysis. The farm transfer to a new entrant (farm succession) and farm closure are modelled 
as separate, mutually exclusive decisions. Exits under other pension schemes are divided into 
involuntary ones (disability pension, etc.) and those by old-age or other forms of pension. 
 
The contribution of this paper to existing literature is that it analyses the impact of 
expected pension, off-farm income and spousal labour status on elderly farmers’ exit deci-
sions. A further contribution is modelling the timing of farmers’ retirement decisions by dura-
tion analysis, which has been widely used in labour market studies, but not yet that much in 
modelling the exiting from farming. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The farmers’ early retirement pro-
grammes in Finland and in the EU are described in Section 2. The following Sections 3 and 4 




2. FARMERS’ EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
 
When studying farmers’ exit behaviour in different countries, institutional differences 
and constraints are found to matter (Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Errington and Lobley, 2002). 
In the European Union, farmers’ early retirement provisions are carried out according to the 
Rural Development Regulation (EC Council Regulation 1257/1999) of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). This regulation aims at securing the income of retiring farmers and to 
improving the livelihood of farms with continuous operation (HE 1999:131). Because the 
early retirement system is voluntary, the procedures and practises of the measures applied in 
the member countries vary substantially. In Ireland, for example, a successor does not have to 
purchase the farm from his parents or siblings but he has to provide a living for the previous 
generation from the farm income. This kind of commitment to financial responsibility to for-
mer owners is not the case, for example, in Finland. More details about retirement pro-
grammes and its practices in the context of EU countries can be found, for example, in Blanc 
and Perrier-Cornet (1993). 
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then, there have been several programmes of short duration including change-of-generation 
pension, farm closure compensation and early retirement aid for farmers. The aim of these 
programmes has been to maintain the livelihood of family farms continuing production and 
thus improving the competitiveness in the agricultural sector. According to these programmes, 
farmers, aged between 55 and 64, who either ceased production of their farms by selling or 
leasing agricultural resources to neighbouring farms or transferred their farm to a new entrant, 
receive retirement benefits corresponding to the disability pension of the farmer. Retirement 
was also possible by reforestation of the land or by lay-land agreement. The early retirement 
benefits are farmer-specific and they depend on the level of pension insurance the farmers 
have purchased over their active farming years (Mela, 2003). Since 1995, Finland has carried 
out farmers’ early retirement programmes within the EU framework for these programmes. 
 
Over the last 30 years, in excess of 67,000 farms have benefited from the farmers’ 
early retirement programmes in Finland. The number of farms involved in the farmers’ early 
retirement programme per year was biggest in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During recent 
years, the number of farms applying to the programme has been decreasing. In 1990, there 
were 2,507 farms applying to this programme, but in 2003, the corresponding number was 
only 604. In Finland, approximately half of the farm transfers utilise the farmers’ early retire-
ment scheme. Whereas at the beginning of 1990s, over 2,000 farms were transferred to new 
entrants annually, by the end of the century, the number of farm transfers was less than half of 
that. As a result, the share of young farmers has declined and the average age of farmers has 






3.1 Duration Model 
 
 
When analysing the survival of the farming couple before the early retirement, the du-
ration spell is the number of years that a farmer or spouse, or both of them, continue farming 
after the farmer has reached the age of pension eligibility at 55 years. The duration spell is 
defined by the age of farmer as the older of the spouses is defined as the farmer in the data. 
Both the eligibility and the age of farmer and spouse are taken into account. This means that 
the duration spell of a farming couple can vary between a minimum of 1 year and a maximum 
of 20 years. A spell with a duration of 1 year is assigned if the farmer or spouse retires straight 
after the farmer reaches the age of 55. The maximum duration of 20 years is assigned if both 
the farmer and the 10 years younger spouse are eligible to the early retirement scheme but 
neither of them utilises it before the age of 65. This would mean in the first place that the 
farmer and then the 10 years younger spouse both had a duration spell of 10 years. The pres-
entation of the duration model below follows Kiefer (1988), Greene (2000) and Woolridge 
(2002). 
 
In the analysis, T is the length of time before the farmer (or spouse) retires. The dura-
tion spell T ≥ 0 varies in the population and t denotes a particular value of T. The cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of T is defined as (Kiefer, 1988) 
 
(1)  , t  ≥ 0    ) ( ) ( t T P t F ≤ =
   
where P denotes probability. The probability of surviving past time t is given by the survival 
function 
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Given that the spell has lasted until time t, the probability that it will end in the next interval 
of time [t, t+h] is 
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when f(t) denotes the density of T, and for each t, λ(t) is the instantaneous rate of leaving per 
unit of time (Woolridge, 2002). Applied to the early retirement of farming couples, the hazard 
function gives the probability of early retirement, given that the farmer or the spouse has not 
retired before. 
 
In the duration analysis, there is a variety of distributions from which to choose for 
modelling. For example, for the Weibull distribution, the hazard function is either monotoni-
cally increasing or decreasing depending on the value of parameter p, and for the exponential 
distribution the hazard function is constant (Kiefer, 1988, Woolridge, 2002). In this study, 
based on the expected shape of the distribution hazard function with positive duration depend-
ence, Weibull distribution is chosen
2. Positive duration dependence in this case means that the 
hazard rate of retirement is increasing in t. Thus, a farmer or spouse is more likely to retire at 
time t given he/she has not retired until time t. The density function of Weibull-distributed 
random variable is 
 
(5)     ) ) ( exp( ) ( ) (
1 p p t t p t f λ λ λ − =
−
   
The corresponding survival function is 
 
(6)     ) ) ( exp( ) (
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And the hazard function is 
 
(7)        
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p t p t λ λ λ
 
The parameters λ and p can be estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. In this study, 
the sample period runs from 1993 to 1998. If the early retirement time of the farmer or spouse 
is not observed or they choose other pension schemes, an observation will be censored (right 
censoring). Censored observations are incorporated in the log-likelihood function as 
 
(8)  ∑ ∑ + =
ns observatio   censored ns observatio   uncensored
) | ( ln ) | ( ln ln θ θ t S t f L   
  
where θ = (λ,p) (Greene, 2000). Since the timing of early retirement is expected to be affected 
by farm and family characteristics, etc., the parametric approach is chosen. In the Weibull 
model, 
 
(9)  () i i x ' exp β λ − =  
     
where i indexes individuals, xi includes a constant term and a set of variables which do not 
  5change from time T = 0 to T = t and β is a parameter vector. Making λi a function of a set of 
regressors is the same as changing the units of measurement in the time axis. The regressors 
do not affect the duration dependence, which is a function of p, either. Let σi = 1/p and 
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and the log-likelihood is 
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3.2 Time-Varying Covariates 
 
 
It is assumed thus far that the covariates are constant from the beginning of the meas-
urement period, T = 0, to the time of the measurement, T = ti. However, for example the la-
bour status of the spouse or farm income may change over the course of spells. Incorporating 
these time-varying covariates into the duration model is based on Greene (2002) which draws 
heavily on Petersen (1986a, 1986b). 
 
Let the interval between 0 and ti be divided as k exhaustive, non-overlapping inter-
vals, t0 < t1 < … < tk-1 < tk , where t0 = 0 and tk = ti. The covariates are assumed to stay con-
stant within each of the k intervals, but may change from one interval to next. Let 
 
(13)   = the hazard function from time t ) ( j x t h > j-1 to tj,  
  
since within that interval, the covariates are constant. Then, from the relationship between the 
hazard function and the survival rate, 
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The survival function for the duration of tk can be written 
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Finally, the density at tk is 
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The log-likelihood function for one observation is 
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Thus, each observation contributes the survivor function to the log-likelihood function. For 
uncensored observations, density, evaluated at the terminal point is added. Therefore, 
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3.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
 
In duration models, the heterogeneity problem may result from an incomplete specifi-
cation. The most common reason for unobserved heterogeneity is an omitted variable. Hetero-
geneity can be taken into account in estimating duration models (Kiefer, 1988). A direct ap-
proach is to model heterogeneity in the parametric model with a survival function conditioned 
on the individual specific effect vi. In this approach, the survival function is treated as S(ti|vi). 
To that is added a model for the unobserved heterogeneity f(vi). Then 
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The gamma distribution is often used for this purpose. In the Weibull model, assuming that v 
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If the model contains a constant, no generality is lost by assuming that the mean of v is 1. 
Thus, E[v] = k/R = 1 or k = R. Now, the unconditional distribution is 
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The variance of v is 1/k, so θ=0 corresponds to the Weibull model (Greene, 2002). The further 








The data on farmers’ exit decisions and retirement choices were obtained from the 
Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution (Mela) and complemented by the farmers’ income data 
and information on farmers’ children by Statistics Finland. The data are a good representation 
of elderly farmers in Finland, since the purchasing of pension insurance from Mela is obliga-
tory for all farmers. 
 
The data consist of a sample of 963 farms (Table 1).  The sample is a random selec-
tion of all farmers born between 1929 and 1943 and stratified according to the farmer’s age  
  7TABLE 1. Summary Statistics of the Data. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min.  Max. 
All sample farms, NT=963 
Farmer age (years)  58.9  4.5 47.0  69.0 
Spouse age (years * spouse)  53.9  5.2 32.0  68.0 
Spouse (0.1)  0.47 0.49 0.0  1.0 
Farming years of farmer   28.6  10.2 1.0  59.0 
Number of children   2.3  1.7 0.0  17.0 
Age of the oldest child (years)   25.7  13.3 0.0  49.0 
Arable land area (hectares)   15.4  14.4 0.0  118.0 
Forest area (hectare)  51.2 63.1 0.0  856.0 
Livestock (0.1)  0.33 0.5 0.0  1.0 
North (0.1)  0.63 0.48 0.0  1.0 
Farmer’s expected pension (€)
a) 608.4 141.3 0.0 1,213 
Spouse’s expected pension (€)
a) 273.2 302.2 0.0 1,220 
Agricultural income (€)  7,185 12,229 0.0  127,365 
Farmer’s off-farm income (€)  1,396 5,007 0.0  88,487 
Spouse’s off-farm income (€)  1,709 5,410 0.0  58,070 
Share of subsidy
b) 0.90  14.61 0.0  962.4 
Farmer early retirement pension (0.1)  0.17 0.37 0.0  1.0 
Spouse early retirement pension (0.1)  0.09 0.29 0.0  1.0 
Farmer continue (0.1)  0.28 0.45 0.0  1.0 
Spouse continue (0.1)  0.26 0.44 0.0  1.0 
Farmer involuntary retirement (0.1)  0.15 0.36 0.0  1.0 
Spouse involuntary retirement (0.1)  0.19 0.14 0.0  1.0 
Farmer old-age pension (0.1)  0.39 0.49 0.0  1.0 
Spouse old-age pension (0.1)  0.69 0.25 0.0  1.0 
Farms choosing early retirement system, NT=194 
Farmer age (years)  59.4  3.9 50.0  70.0 
Spouse age (years * spouse)  55.8  3.9 43.0  66.0 
Spouse (0.1)  0.71 0.46 0.0  1.0 
Farming years of farmer   30.5  8.4  4.0  53.0 
Number of children   2.6  1.9 0.0  17.0 
Age of the oldest child (years)   29.1  11.1 0.0  47.0 
Arable land area (hectares)   21.3  14.3 0.0  97.0 
Forest area (hectares)  52.5 48.8 1.0  338.0 
Livestock (0.1)  0.28 0.45 0.0  1.0 
North (0.1)  0.64 0.48 0.0  1.0 
Farmer’s expected pension (€)
a) 648.9 130.6 0.0 1,213 
Spouse’s expected pension (€)
a) 433.7 302.3 0.0 1,220 
Agricultural income (€)  8,591 15,795 0.0  127,365 
Farmer’s off-farm income (€)  491.6 2,997 0.0  36,446 
Spouse’s off-farm income (€)  880.5 4,215 0.0  44,306 
Share of subsidy
b) 0.34  2.2 0.0  60.3 
Farmer early retirement pension (0.1)  0.83 0.38 0.0  1.0 
Spouse early retirement pension (0.1)  0.49 0.50 0.0  1.0 
Spouse involuntary retirement (0.1)  0.03 0.16 0.0  1.0 
Farmer other pension (0.1)  0.10 0.30 0.0  1.0 
Spouse other pension (0.1)  0.05 0.22 0.0  1.0 
a)  Expected pension if retired under the farmers’ early retirement schemes 
b)  (Subsidy for barley per hectare * land, hectare)/agricultural income per farm 
  8corresponding to the share of all farmers at every age. All sample farmers were active farmers  
in 1993. The data set forms a balanced panel prior to the retirement and runs from the year 
1993 to the year 1998. All farmers in the data set were eligible in the farmers’ early retirement 
scheme during the study period according to his/her age. The oldest farmer was 64 years old 
in 1993 and youngest one was 55 years old in 1998. Sample farms differ from each other by a 
number of characteristics such as forest area, location and production line. Thus, they form a 
heterogeneous group and heterogeneity is accounted for in the estimation. There is no infor-
mation available on income post retirement. 
 
Almost half (47%) of the farmers in the sample have a spouse. Thus, there are 456 
farms operated by couples. The share is much higher on farms choosing farmers’ early retire-
ment pension, 71% (Table 1). The older member of the farming couple is defined as the 
farmer and younger as the spouse, since eligibility to the early retirement scheme is deter-
mined by the age of the oldest person among the couple. The farmer is on the average 5 years 
older than the spouse. 
 
A descriptive statistics of the data for all sample farms and those choosing the farm-
ers’ early retirement system are presented in Table 1. Those farmers and spouses choosing 
early retirement have more children than those not choosing early retirement. On average, the 
oldest child is also older on these farms than on other farms. Farms choosing an early retire-
ment pension also are slightly larger than other farms in the sample measured by arable land 
and forest area. Farms choosing the early retirement system are more often located in northern 
parts of the country and are other than livestock farms. These farms also have higher farm 
income and smaller off-farm income than other farms in the sample. 
 
 
4.2 Variable Definitions 
 
 
The analysis concentrates on those farms choosing the farmers’ early retirement sys-
tem. A farming couple is defined as choosing the farmers’ early retirement scheme if either 
the farmer or the spouse retires, or they both retire, under the farmers’ early retirement 
scheme. Exits under the farmers’ early retirement system are further characterised by two 
discrete occupational choices: (i) exit and transfer of the farm to a new entrant, or (ii) exit and 
closing down the farm (Figure 1). Closing down the farm includes selling or leasing agricul-
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FIGURE 1. Choice of the Pension Scheme in the Study. 
 
Farmer’s and spouse’s other “pension choices” are included as independent dummy 
variables in the analysis in order to capture the effect of spousal retirement on the farmers’ 
and the spouses’ early retirement decisions. Other pension choice possibilities are: involuntary 
  9retirement (disability pension, etc.), retirement under other pension scheme (old-age pension, 
etc.) or continuation of farming (Figure 1). Since all entrepreneurs must give up farming 
when one of them is applying for the early retirement scheme, there are no farmers or spouses 
continuing farming among those farms choosing the farmers’ early retirement system (Table 
1). 
 
Out of the 963 sample farms, on 194 farms (20%) the farmer or the spouse chooses to 
retire within the framework of the farmers’ early retirement pension (Appendix A). More than 
one half of these farms are transferred to a new entrant. Amongst the 456 farms operated by a 
couple, 137 (30%) apply for the early retirement scheme. Out of these farms, in one third (42) 
of the cases only a farmer and in one fourth (33) of the cases only a spouse applies for the 
scheme. In 45% of the cases, early retirement is a joint decision of farming couple. As a total, 
17% of the farmers and 21% of the spouses in the sample retire under the farmers’ early re-
tirement scheme. A large majority of the spouses (61%) and almost one third (28%) of the 
farmers continue farming. 15% of the farmers but only 4% of the spouses retire involuntarily. 
Old-age or other pension scheme is chosen by 40% of the farmers and by 14% of the spouses. 
 
Variables included in the analysis are selected according to the availability of data 
and a priori expectations on the important factors in explaining the timing of retirement. The 
economic incentive to retire or to continue farming is measured as the expected pension of the 
farmer and of the spouse if retired under the farmers’ early retirement scheme, and by agricul-
tural income. Similarly, off-farm income of a farmer and a spouse are used as explanatory 
variables in the analysis to reflect higher propensity to exit farming. The sample average is 
43% of agricultural income with a large dispersion. 
 
In earlier studies, the probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant has been 
found first to increase with a farmer’s age and then beyond a certain age limit to decrease 
(Kimhi and Bollman, 1999, Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001). This is 
especially the case in family successions. On the contrary, the probability of other forms of 
exit is found to increase with a farmer’s age (Kimhi, 1994, Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi 
and Nachlieli, 2001, Pietola et al., 2003). Also, the number of children living on a farm has 
been found to increase succession probability (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000, Glauben et al., 
2004). On the other hand, Potter and Lobley (1992) found that farmers without a successor do 
not have the motivation to expand their farms but tend to reduce their working hours (shadow 
effect). 
 
The variables concerning farm family are: the age of farmer and spouse, the existence 
of a spouse, the number of children and the age of the oldest child. In addition, we defined 
how many years a farmer has been farming. 
 
The bigger the farm, the more likely the succession and less likely the farm closure 
are found to be (Gasson et al., 1988, Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000, Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001, 
Glauben et al., 2004, Hennessy, 2002, Pietola et al. 2003). In this study, farm size is measured 
in hectares of arable land and forest area. 
 
Other farm characteristics included in the analysis are variables defining farm loca-
tion and production line. A dummy variable “Livestock” separates livestock farms (dairy, 
cattle, pig, poultry, sheep, goat and horse farms) from arable crop farms. Farms are further 
divided into those located in northern and those located in southern parts of the country. The 
division is made according to the EU subsidy areas in Finland so that northern area includes 
areas classified as C2, C3 and C4. The dummy variable is called “North”. 
 
In addition, in order to capture the effect of subsidies, a new variable is formed by 
multiplying the area subsidy for barley per hectare by the farm’s land area and dividing the 
sum by the agricultural income per farm (“Share of subsidy”). 
  105. RESULTS 
 
 
The survival of farming couples after their eligibility under the farmers’ early retire-
ment scheme and before their actual retirement varied between 1 and 16 years. Out of those 
194 couples choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension, 108 retired by transferring the 
farm to a new entrant and 86 closed down their farm. The survival time of farming couples 
when transferring the farm to a new entrant varied between 1 and 15 years and the survival of 
those closing down their farm varied between 1 and 16 years. The average survival time was 
shorter on farm transfers (4.41 years) than on farm closures (5.67 years). 
 
 
5.1 Farm Transfer 
 
 
The Weibull p parameters for the farming couple survival model before a farm trans-
fer to a new entrant are statistically significant and p>1 indicating increasing hazard function 
and increasing probability of early retirement over time (Table 2). The parameter estimate for 
θ in the Weibull survival model with gamma heterogeneity is statistically significant and it 
differs from zero. The likelihood ratio test
3, however, shows that Weibull distribution model 
including unobserved heterogeneity does not significantly differ from the basic Weibull 
model. The signs of the remaining parameter estimates are robust and do not vary between 
models due to the inclusion of the heterogeneity parameter. Therefore, it seems that the model 
with unobserved heterogeneity does not result in a significant improvement on the basic 
Weibull model. 
 
The factors significantly increasing the farming couple survival probability before a 
farm is transferred to a new entrant are: the farmer's age, existence of a spouse, forest area, 
farm income, the spouse's off-farm income, the share of barley subsidy of farm income and 
the old-age or other pension of the farmer and spouse. 
 
On the other hand, factors significantly decreasing farming couple survival probabil-
ity are identified to be: the spouse's age, the number of children, the age of the oldest child, 
arable land area, northern location and expected pension of the farmer and spouse. 
 
 
5.2 Farm Closure 
 
 
Weibull p parameter estimates for the survival model before farm closure are statisti-
cally significant and p>1 indicating increasing hazard function over time (Table 2). The pa-
rameter estimate for θ is statistically significant and gets a value of 4.99. Based on the likeli-
hood ratio test, the Weibull distribution model incorporating unobserved heterogeneity is not, 
however, found to be statistically a better specification than the basic Weibull model. The 
only changes in coefficient signs between the two models caused by the inclusion of unob-
served heterogeneity in the model show up in the following parameters: off-farm income of 
the spouse and involuntary retirement of the spouse. Neither of these variables is found to be 
statistically significant. 
 
According to the results, the factors significantly increasing the farming couple's sur-
vival probability before a farm closure are: the farmer's age, existence of a spouse, the number 
of children, forest area, the farm being a livestock farm, farm income, the farmer's off-farm 
income and the old-age or other pension of the farmer. Factors significantly decreasing sur-
vival probability on the other hand are: the spouse's age, farming years and a northern loca-
tion. 
  11TABLE 2. Results from the Duration Analysis (t values in parentheses)
4. 
  Farm transfer  Farm closure 
  Basic Weibull Latent heterog. Basic Weibull  Latent heterog.
   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient
Constant   -0.3304  -1.0833 -7.2744
*** -8.7891
***
 (-0.294) (-0.883) (-12.716)  (-14.273)





 (25.421) (24.982) (21.078)  (22.297)





  (-6.694) (-6.045) (-7.698)    (-6.891)





 (8.625) (8.466) (3.104)  (2.884)
Farming years   -0.0043  -0.0058
*  -0.0049
* -0.0015
 (-1.347) (-1.757) (-1.888)  (-0.528)





 (-4.663) (-4.576) (3.782)  (2.618)
Age of the oldest child   -0.0301
***  -0.0253
***  -0.0033  -0.0007
 (-8.148) (-  7.168) (-1.389)  (-0.259)
Land area   -0.0124
***  -0.0143
***  0.00009  0.0005
 (-7.221) (-7.192) (0.052)  (0.255)





 (2.775) (1.943) (2.450)  (2.662)
Livestock farm   0.0579  0.0553  0.1879
***  0.1984
***
 (1.316) (1.137) (4.058)  (4.187)





 (-4.520) (-3.560) (-2.265)  (-.1.849)
Farmer exp. pension,    -1.0383
***  -0.9879
***  0.0316   0.0119
log (-6.626) (-6.025) (0.791)  (0.273)
Spouse exp. pension,    -0.9286
***  -1.176
***  -0.0808   -0.1592
log (-7.585) (-7.384) (-0.528)  (-0.740)





log (16.384) (16.477) (3.788)  (3.331)
Farmer off-farm income,    0.0098  0.0119  0.0431
***  0.0511
***
log (0.936) (1.226) (4.980)  (5.945)
Spouse off-farm income,    0.0296
***  0.0131  0.0034  -0.0013
log (3.043) (1.390) (0.506)  (-0.171)
Share of subsidy   0.1027
***  0.1191
***  0.0005  0.0009
 (3.076) (4.022) (0.113)  (0.155)
Spouse involuntary retir.   0.0524  0.1015  -0.0491   0.0575
 (0.234) (0.488) (-0.311)  (0.266)
Farmer old-age pension   0.7095
***  0.6353
***   0.3728
***  0.2723
**
 (6.455) (5.371) (3.585)  (2.664)
Spouse old-age pension   0.4287
**  0.5121
**  0.0474   0.2132






 (24.993) (15.681) (22.331)  (12.550)
Theta (θ) - 1.6705
*** - 4.9893
***
 (4.568)   (4.846)
Log-likelihood   -1535.80 -1517.17  -1278.960  -1257.645
Lambda (λ)  0.035  0.0513  0.057   0.0929





 (24.992) (15.681) (22.332)  (12.549)
  125.3 Comparison of Farm Transfer and Closure Cases 
 
 
When comparing parameter estimates, it is found that the predicted effects of differ-
ent factors differ between farm transfer and closure only in case of some variables. The age of 
the spouse is found to advance and the age of farmer is found to delay the timing of early re-
tirement in both retirement alternatives. This is in agreement with earlier findings that after 
first increasing, retirement and especially succession probability starts to decrease with the 
farmer’s age (Kimhi and Bollman, 1999, Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000, Kimhi and Nachlieli, 
2001, Pietola et al., 2003). The existence of a spouse is found to delay both farm transfers and 
closures. The result of postponing retirement on farms where the spouse is also working on 
the farm tallies with the earlier findings of Glauben et al. (2004). But, the longer the farmer 
has been farming, the sooner the farm will be closed down. 
 
It is found that the number of children advances farm transfers but delays farm clo-
sures. Also this result corresponds with the earlier findings of Glauben et al. (2004) who 
found that the number of family members reduces planned time until farm succession. Also, 
the age of the oldest child is found to significantly advance farm transfers. This is very under-
standable: the older the possible successor is, the more likely succession is to take place. 
 
The bigger the farm, the earlier it will be transferred to a successor. This result is con-
sistent with earlier findings of e.g. Pietola et al. (2003) based on Finnish data. The forest area 
and agricultural income delay both farm succession and closure decisions. On the other hand, 
the share of subsidy of farm income delays farm transfers. And, livestock farms are found to 
be closed down later than other types of farms. In northern parts of the country, both farm 
transfers and closures take place earlier than in the south.  
 
In earlier studies, pension benefits are found to be significant determinants of retire-
ment probability (e.g. Asch et al., 2005). Here, the expected pension of the farmer and spouse 
are found to advance farm succession but have no effect on the timing of farm closure. 
 
The off-farm income of the farmer has been found previously to both encourage farm 
successions (Kimhi, 1994) and to accelerate farm exits (e.g. Goetz and Debertin, 2001). Here, 
the results suggest that farmer and spouse off-farm income have qualitatively different effects. 
Off-farm income of the farmer is predicted to delay farm closures whereas off-farm income of 
the spouse is predicted to delay farm transfers. Thus, off-farm income of elderly farmers is not 
found to promote but to slow down the development of farming structure. The result also is 
consistent with earlier findings of Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) that the probability of farm 
succession is lower on part-time farms. 
 
Unlike what was expected, the involuntary retirement of a spouse is not found to af-
fect on the timing of farmers’ early retirement. The old-age or other pension of the farmer is 
found to delay the spouse's retirement in case of both farm transfer and closure. In addition, 
old-age or other pension of the spouse is found to delay the farmer's early retirement in farm 
transfers. Thus, farmers and spouses are not found to co-ordinate their early retirement deci-
sions to the spousal retirement under other pension schemes than under the farmers’ early 
retirement system
5. One reason for this might be that even though the older of the spouses is 
retiring under an old-age or other pension scheme, the younger spouse continues farming as 
long as s/he is eligible for the EU subsidy schemes which keep farming financially viable. 
Another explanation might be that when in good state of health, the retiring spouse continues 





  136. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this study, the effect of a spousal retirement decision, economic incentives and 
farm and family characteristics on timing of farmers’ early retirement decisions are analysed. 
Farmers’ early retirement are divided into those transferring their farm to a new entrant and 
those closing down their farm. 
 
Farm transfers, in general, are found to take place somewhat earlier than farm clo-
sures. One should also notice that when studying farm retirement, it is important to analyse 
retirement decisions of both the spouses, not just those of the farmer. In this study, in 17% of 
cases, only the spouse applied for the farmers’ early retirement scheme. Ignoring the spouse’s 
early retirement would result in biased results due to missing observation on spousal early 
retirement cases. Also, farm retirements would take place earlier than they actually do. 
 
When comparing farms operated by couples to all sample farms, it is found that ap-
plying for an early retirement scheme and especially farm succession takes place more often 
on the farms with two entrepreneurs. The same applies for the farmers’ early retirement 
choices. In 45% of the farms operated by a couple and utilising farmers’ early retirement 
scheme, both the farmer and spouse apply simultaneously for the early retirement pension. 
 
On those farms where the spouse is also employed on the farm, early retirement takes 
place later. But, the older the spouse, the earlier the farm is transferred to a new entrant or, 
alternatively, closed down. Contradicting that, an increasing farmer age delays both farm 
transfers and closures. This tallies with earlier findings that after first increasing, the probabil-
ity of farm succession starts especially to decrease beyond certain age. 
 
Besides the farming couple, farm and family characteristics and financial factors are 
found to matter. The existence of a possible successor significantly affects the timing of early 
retirement. The number of children advances farm successions, but delays farm closures. And 
also, the older the oldest child is, the sooner the farm is transferred to a new entrant. Farm size 
is also found to affect on timing of farmers’ early retirement. The bigger the farm, the sooner 
the farm is transferred to a new entrant. 
 
A high level of farm income delays farmers’ early retirement. Depending on the farm 
income and pension payments paid by the farming couple during the active farming years, a 
high level of expected pension of farmer and spouse advance farm transfers. 
Off-farm income of the spouse delays transfer of the farm to a new entrant and off-
farm income of the farmer delays closing down the farm. Postponing retirement results in a 
delay in transferring of resources to a new entrant or to those farmers expanding their activi-
ties. Thus, off-farm income may slow down the structural development in the farming sector. 
 
In earlier studies, spousal retirement is found to strongly influence the individual’s re-
tirement decisions. Results of this study support the view with findings of the farming cou-
ple’s joint early retirement decision. Unlike prior expectations, farmers are not found to co-










  14Appendix A. 
 
Number of sample farms, farmers and spouses according to the choice of pension scheme on 
all farms and on farms operated by a couple. 
 
 All farms  Farms Farmers Spouses
Early retirement pension  194 161 95
 - Farm transfer  108 91 54
 - Farm closure  86 70 41
Continue farming  387 276 277
Involuntary exit  0 147 18
Other pension  382 378 66
Total 963 963 456
 Farms with a spouse  Farms Farmers Spouses
Early retirement pension  137 104 95
 - Farm transfer  76 59 54
 - Farm closure  61 45 41
Continue farming  178 170 277
Involuntary exit  0 46 18
Other pension  141 136 66
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2.  “The results based on other distributions commonly used in empirical analysis such as 
exponential, log-normal and logistic can be obtained from the author upon request.” 
 
3.  ”χ




*** a triple asterisk denotes significance at two sided 1% level, 
** a double asterisk de-
notes significance at two sided 5% level, 
* an asterisk denotes significance at two sided 
10% level 
 
5.  I have also estimated the farmer survival model including dummy variable spouse’s 
retirement under the farmers’ early retirement scheme which showed to be statistically 
significant, got a negative sign and did not alter the remaining effects. However, due to 
endogenous nature of the farming couple’s early retirement decision the analysis is based 
on a model excluding the dummy variable. 
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